Though the US has not entirely abandoned the idea of brokering a deal between Russia and Ukraine, it has become clear that the White House administration is no longer Ukraine\u2019s ally but rather a negotiator between the two sides. Kyiv is now counting less on US military aid, looking to Europe for equipment and support. Ukrainians have never expected European or American boots on the ground. From the beginning of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion, Ukrainians knew that the only troops they could guarantee would be internal. Ukraine now has an 880,000-strong battle-hardened military \u2013 Europe\u2019s largest and most experienced. According to Ukraine\u2019s spy chief, Kyrylo Budanov, the country\u2019s total defence forces exceed 1 million. In 2023 65% of Ukrainians <\/span><\/i>attested<\/span><\/i><\/a> to having loved ones at the front, a figure that is likely higher now.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n However, while Ukrainians initially lined up voluntarily at military recruitment centres in 2022, mobilizing new recruits in the third year of a brutal war with virtually no rules \u2013 where Russia employs nearly all its available weapons, conducts relentless artillery fire, airstrikes and drone attacks, and openly tortures and executes prisoners \u2013 has become a major challenge. In a recent interview, president <\/span><\/i>Volodymyr Zelenskyy<\/span><\/i><\/a> stated that Ukraine <\/span><\/i>has lost over 46,000 soldiers, with 380,000 wounded and tens of thousands missing in action<\/span><\/i>. Acute personnel shortages are pushing the government to explore new mobilization strategies.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n Last year The Public Interest Journalism Lab (PIJL), in collaboration with the Kharkiv Institute for Social Research (KISR), studied <\/span><\/i>what motivates or deters people from military service<\/span><\/i><\/a>. The following article draws on the study\u2019s findings with added comment from new recruits and their families. <\/span><\/i>Some interviewee names have been changed.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n Sashko, a 45-year-old advertiser, didn\u2019t join the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in 2022 because his wife was pregnant. He and Maryna, a 37-year-old journalist, who had been married for over a decade when they welcomed their daughter into the world in May 2022, put mobilization on hold. \u2018My husband volunteered, helped military friends and built small drones. When our daughter started kindergarten, we knew we had to change our lives,\u2019 says Maryna. \u2018We reorganized family life: he serves, I raise our child, and he helps out when he can.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n Maryna believes this is the only viable model in Ukraine today: \u2018Everyone should contribute to defence and not sit it out.\u2019 Originally from Donbas, the couple lost their home and fled their hometown in 2014. They refuse to lose another in Kyiv. \u2018Ten years ago,I visited the front as a journalist, hoping my young nephews wouldn\u2019t notice what I was doing, says Maryna. Reflecting further on the early stages of war, she continues: \u2018It didn\u2019t work out. Now we must ensure things don\u2019t freeze where they are. Otherwise, what was it all for?\u2019 According to the UN, Ukraine lost over 13,000 lives and 20% of its territory was occupied from 2014 to 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n Sashko joined as a marine in May 2024 and is currently stationed on Ukraine\u2019s northern border with Russia, utilizing his expertise in unmanned systems. Maryna says their biggest fear was that Sashko would end up in an unfamiliar unit, unable to contribute fully. \u2018When my husband researched units, he asked about commanders and their treatment of subordinates. Friends\u2019 direct feedback was decisive. It\u2019s a combat unit where it\u2019s imperative that everyone listens to one another.\u2019 A unit HR officer guided Sashko through paperwork, training and onboarding, alleviating his primary fears of getting lost in the chaos of the war machine, finding himself in a completely unfamiliar place and losing control over his life.<\/span><\/p>\n Sashko\u2019s brother-in-arms, Vitaliy, a 38-year-old banker from Dnipro, also delayed joining up in 2022 for family reasons: \u2018My wife refused to move abroad with the kids. She stayed with me. I decided to help my family.\u2019 In 2024, after receiving two draft summonses in the street, Vitaliy chose to serve. \u2018I felt uneasy \u2013 others were serving, not me. I felt it was my time to go. I dropped my kids at school and texted a serving friend to help with a \u201creference letter\u201dto his unit.\u2019<\/span> Vitaliy signed a contract and joined the marines. Knowing he\u2019d serve with friends and hearing honest feedback about the unit and commanders\u2019 attitude toward subordinates was crucial.<\/span><\/p>\n The war has inflicted irreparable losses and increased existential insecurity.<\/span> A key insight from the study suggests that fostering a sense of control in uncertain times, especially during recruitment, reduces anxiety and motivates war-traumatized people to enlist. <\/span>Now that the war has entered its third year, respondents expressed a societal demand for autonomy. Both Sashko\u2019s and Vitaliy\u2019s families felt more in control knowing where their loved ones would serve, what they\u2019d do and with whom. Multiple reputable units are always on the lookout for skilled drone engineers, so Sashko\u2019s targeted posting with friends and receiving HR support were pivotal for his family. One civilian succinctly explained the popularity of certain Ukrainian military units: \u2018Why do more people choose, for example, the Third Assault Brigade? Because they actually see what will happen to them there.\u2019<\/span> Another respondent said: \u2018Making your own decisions motivates \u2013 when you\u2019re treated as a person, not cannon fodder.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n Soldiers and civilians alike noted how demotivating it is when specialized skills are ignored, sending people wherever manpower is needed, regardless of experience. Deployment to infantry assault units, which incur a high level of casualties, is especially concerning.\u00a0 As one young respondent admitted: \u2018Here I am, an engineer with a degree. What position would they assign me to other than an assault soldier? And who would even care about this when there\u2019s already a shortage of people? That\u2019s what\u2019s scary about it.\u2019 One veteran urged: \u2018Show people that their skills can get them a fitting role. Not everyone can be in assault troops.\u2019 The army\u2019s combat capability suffers from the inefficient distribution of people to units when their professional skills are not taken into account.<\/span><\/p>\n Military command nevertheless insists that, given Russia\u2019s numerical advantage bolstered by North Korean units, they must send troops to hold trenches. In a war with scarce long-range, high-tech weapons, Ukraine is forced into symmetrical responses, sacrificing infantrymen.<\/span><\/p>\n Former Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk, now chairman of the Center for Defense Strategies, goes further, arguing that the solution lies not in numbers but in changing warfare tactics. On 1 June Ukraine conducted one such tactical development: Spider Web, a pioneering intelligence operation, targeted Russian strategic bombers, including those developed to carry nuclear bombs, with drones as far away as Murmansk above the Arctic Circle, over 8,000 km from Ukraine. In an unprecedented operation, which took 18 months to develop, more than 100 drones were smuggled into Russia, hidden and transported into five different regions close to the military bases and airports. They were then launched and piloted remotely. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Spider Web cost Russia 41 planes, calculating the damage at $7bln. The Russian Ministry of Defense has confirmed the attacks, but said that only a few planes were affected. Ukraine has targeted Russian military objects with drones numerous times over the past three years, but Spider Web is remarkable, due to its scale, range and ambition.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018The army no longer expects many recruits from society\u2019, <\/span>says study co-author, sociologist, KISR director and soldier Denys Kobzin. \u2018The Armed Forces of Ukraine has introduced tools like the Army+ app for transfers and handling cases of AWOL returns. Internal headhunting has surged over the past six months: units invest in ads for \u201cmore effective\u201d, \u201cnew\u201d, \u201ctop\u201d units.\u2019 Although not everyone, like Sashko, can choose their role, our study shows that Ukraine could expand its options for roles and units, letting recruits apply skills and take some control over their lives. After all, in the army, each army profession is important and all are needed. \u2018When I hear, \u201cI won\u2019t touch a weapon\u201d, it depresses me,\u2019 says Vitaliy. \u2018You can load ammo, cook food.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n 59th Motorized Brigade household, 2022. Image via Ministry of Defense of Ukraine via Wikimedia Commons<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Recruitment communication targets recruits, but families \u2013 wives, parents \u2013 often have the final say. For Sashko and Vitaliy, family circumstances delayed service, but spousal and parental support were key motivators to join the army.<\/span> \u2018My wife and mother were initially shocked,\u2019 says Vitaliy. \u2018But my wife said she saw I was unsettled at home. They\u2019re proud of me and that\u2019s motivating.\u2019 Based on study evidence, we would recommend that messages are crafted for wives and mothers of men of draft age, explaining service benefits for families and the nation as a whole to help diminish traumatic registration experiences.<\/span><\/p>\n Admittedly, communication alone, without state or unit support, isn\u2019t enough to drive change. \u2018I have contacts for Sashko\u2019s brothers-in-arms and commanders,\u2019 says Maryna, \u2019but no one has reached out to me separately.\u2019 She calls separate support for families \u2018cool\u2019. Patronage services such as contacting families during emergencies, offering aid and taking charge of injuries or deaths make a significant difference. Units like Azov provide effective support, building family communities \u2013 a model worth scaling.<\/span><\/p>\n When it comes to big decisions and conclusions, family is also a crucial source of information. Ukrainians have come to rely more heavily on informal sources of information such as Telegram and friends and family. An<\/span> opinion poll <\/span><\/a>from March 2024 conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation showed that the top three sources of information on the war are Ukrainian Telegram channels (53%), relatives, friends and colleagues (42%), and YouTube (40%).<\/span><\/p>\n Most respondents agree that the patriotic fervor of 2022 has waned. One military recruiter noted a government mistake at the time: \u2018Many couldn\u2019t enlist in the invasion\u2019s early days, because their data hadn\u2019t been recorded. No work was done with them and the patriotic zeal was lost.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n It is widely noted that, despite readiness to resist Russia, the sobering reality is that the most motivated individuals have already volunteered. One veteran pointed to an important change in people\u2019s attitudes, which may partially explain the difficulties encountered during the mobilization process: at first, many people \u2018rushed to defend\u2019 the country as volunteers; later, civilians became convinced that \u2018the guys are doing a good job\u2019, a misconception reinforced by official communication. And then \u2018fear set in\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n Respondents below draft age feel more financially and existentially insecure compared to other respondent groups. One of the young respondents said that \u2018negative motivation\u2019 had emerged because Ukrainians have begun looking at the war\u2019s development more impartially: \u2018The rose-colored glasses have gone, and the understanding and vision of the situation has become rational.\u2019 Now that the war has become protracted, such sentiments indicate a more sober view. Ultimately, this will strengthen Ukraine\u2019s resilience, as it will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of domestic and international circumstances. However, Russia will continue to actively exploit any sense of fatigue or pessimism to weaken Western support for Ukraine and destabilize Ukrainian society.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018It\u2019s clear that war isn\u2019t for everyone. Not wanting to serve doesn\u2019t mean wanting to become Russian,\u2019 says Kobzin. \u2018A consensus has formed: some fight, others live their lives. Many avoid the unpleasantries of the army,\u00a0 the loss of comfort, family, risking injury, or even death. Every war has been like this. This one is no exception.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n According to a 2024 <\/span>survey<\/span><\/a> conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center sociological service, most Ukrainians (73%) believe that Russia must fulfill certain conditions before peace talks can begin. A <\/span>poll<\/span><\/a> conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in September-October 2024 found that 81% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine can succeed if the West provides adequate support. This survey was conducted before Donald Trump\u2019s second election victory and his fluctuating support for Ukraine. However, most studies show that Ukrainians are not ready to accept peace on Russia\u2019s terms and are ready to fight if there are no other alternatives to a just peace.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018No one knows the exact losses; there\u2019s a lot of criticism of commanders, weapon shortages. People often focus on the worst outcome of service \u2013\u00a0 loss of life. Yet, people still enlist, even voluntarily,\u2019 Kobzin says. \u2018Talk of negotiations and expectations of a quick resolution will negatively affect these statistics. But we need to work not so much with those adamantly against service but with those who have fears that can be addressed.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n Vitaliy says Donald Trump\u2019s statements motivated him to fight: \u2018You know you need to be here.\u2019 Maryna adds: \u2018Every morning, I ask what negotiated outcome I\u2019d want. I\u2019d love my husband back soon but not at the cost of surrendering or forgiving the Russians. We can\u2019t agree to freeze things as they are.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n In early February Ukraine\u2019s Defense Ministry offered one-year contracts for 1 million hryvnias (\u20ac23,500) to attract 18-24-year-old recruits. Vitaliy says he called a friend who has a 20-year-old son when he heard about the initiative and asked if he was ready to go to war on such terms. The answer was no. \u2018It\u2019s a big sum, even with inflation, but I want motivated people beside me, not those joining out of desperation.\u2019 <\/span>Ukraine still lacks legally defined terms of service \u2013 a reform that soldiers and families had anticipated but was still absent from the 2024-updated mobilization law, so m<\/span>otivation, clear communication, and better training and service conditions remain critical encouragement.<\/span><\/p>\n US Vice President, J.D. Vance\u2019s Munich Security Conference speech, claiming that Europe\u2019s real security threat is its issues with <\/span>internal democracy and free speech,<\/span> not Russia, was a wake-up call for European leaders. With US troop presence in Europe and NATO ties in question, EU nations, especially Baltic and Scandinavian states, are revising their defence strategies.<\/span><\/p>\n In a potential NATO-Russia conflict, Western nations would have access to high-tech weapons, but training programmes would be lacking. As a <\/span>RUSI<\/span><\/a> report notes: \u2018High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train \u2013 time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018A key lesson: we weren\u2019t ready in the first six months of the invasion to absorb many recruits. Our defence system \u2013 training, logistics \u2013 wasn\u2019t prepared,\u2019 says Kobzin. \u2018You need to mobilize many people at the onset of aggression before they reconsider.\u2019 Kobzin believes it is necessary to develop a system of training from childhood onwards. \u2018Polls in European countries show that the percentage of people willing to fight with weapons today is small. Everyone thinks it won\u2019t happen to their country. But we thought the same,\u2019 he says. Europe should emulate Ukraine\u2019s whole-of-society defence approach, fostering government, civil society, and business collaboration to build Western societal resilience and readiness to act.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018Since the Second World War, Europe hasn\u2019t questioned its survival. But large-scale war has returned to the continent and it is time to seriously rethink Europe\u2019s security architecture, which has always relied on the US\u2019s security umbrella,\u2019 emphasizes Jaroslava Barbieri, doctoral student at the University of Birmingham and co-author of this study. \u2018Today, Europe needs to have an honest and consistent conversation with its societies about the fact that war is already here, to reject the illusion that people are safe, and to finally abandon the old political strategies that tried to include Russia in the European security architecture. Talking about values, democracy and a common cultural space are empty words without a consistent conversation about the transformation of the European security framework.\u2019 Barbieri considers exclusively focusing on a high-tech, professional army is flawed in light of the Ukrainian experience. During a full-scale invasion, virtually everyone has to be on the defensive. Society is ideally prepared. \u2018The Ukrainian experience of how to communicate with society, how to encourage, how to take into account mistakes, is invaluable for Europe. Ukraine should be given a leadership role in conversations about changing the defence paradigm.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The stories of Sashko and Vitaliy highlight findings from the 2024 PIJL and KISR study, based on 17 in-depth online interviews and discussions with three focus groups conducted in March and April across Ukraine. Participants included active AFU soldiers, civilian men (above and below draft age)<\/span><\/i>, wives and mothers of soldiers, and veterans. <\/span><\/i>The Public Interest Journalism Lab<\/span><\/i><\/a> is a Ukrainian media NGO, which promotes constructive discussion around complex social topics, combining content creation and sociological research, to explore how to overcome polarization.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\nFamily and unit<\/h2>\n
Targeted recruitment and autonomy<\/h2>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.eurozine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/UA_59th_bgd_household_03-1024x491.jpg\")
<\/p>\nFamilies play crucial role\u00a0<\/span><\/h2>\n
Reluctance to serve doesn\u2019t mean supporting Russia<\/h2>\n
What should Europeans prepare for?<\/h2>\n
![Wikimedia Commons<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\nFamilies play crucial role\u00a0<\/span><\/h2>\nRecruitment communication targets recruits, but families \u2013 wives, parents \u2013 often have the final say. For Sashko and Vitaliy, family circumstances delayed service, but spousal and parental support were key motivators to join the army.<\/span> \u2018My wife and mother were initially shocked,\u2019 says Vitaliy. \u2018But my wife said she saw I was unsettled at home. They\u2019re proud of me and that\u2019s motivating.\u2019 Based on study evidence, we would recommend that messages are crafted for wives and mothers of men of draft age, explaining service benefits for families and the nation as a whole to help diminish traumatic registration experiences.<\/span><\/p>\nAdmittedly, communication alone, without state or unit support, isn\u2019t enough to drive change. \u2018I have contacts for Sashko\u2019s brothers-in-arms and commanders,\u2019 says Maryna, \u2019but no one has reached out to me separately.\u2019 She calls separate support for families \u2018cool\u2019. Patronage services such as contacting families during emergencies, offering aid and taking charge of injuries or deaths make a significant difference. Units like Azov provide effective support, building family communities \u2013 a model worth scaling.<\/span><\/p>\nWhen it comes to big decisions and conclusions, family is also a crucial source of information. Ukrainians have come to rely more heavily on informal sources of information such as Telegram and friends and family. An<\/span> opinion poll <\/span><\/a>from March 2024 conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation showed that the top three sources of information on the war are Ukrainian Telegram channels (53%), relatives, friends and colleagues (42%), and YouTube (40%).<\/span><\/p>\nReluctance to serve doesn\u2019t mean supporting Russia<\/h2>\nMost respondents agree that the patriotic fervor of 2022 has waned. One military recruiter noted a government mistake at the time: \u2018Many couldn\u2019t enlist in the invasion\u2019s early days, because their data hadn\u2019t been recorded. No work was done with them and the patriotic zeal was lost.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nIt is widely noted that, despite readiness to resist Russia, the sobering reality is that the most motivated individuals have already volunteered. One veteran pointed to an important change in people\u2019s attitudes, which may partially explain the difficulties encountered during the mobilization process: at first, many people \u2018rushed to defend\u2019 the country as volunteers; later, civilians became convinced that \u2018the guys are doing a good job\u2019, a misconception reinforced by official communication. And then \u2018fear set in\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\nRespondents below draft age feel more financially and existentially insecure compared to other respondent groups. One of the young respondents said that \u2018negative motivation\u2019 had emerged because Ukrainians have begun looking at the war\u2019s development more impartially: \u2018The rose-colored glasses have gone, and the understanding and vision of the situation has become rational.\u2019 Now that the war has become protracted, such sentiments indicate a more sober view. Ultimately, this will strengthen Ukraine\u2019s resilience, as it will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of domestic and international circumstances. However, Russia will continue to actively exploit any sense of fatigue or pessimism to weaken Western support for Ukraine and destabilize Ukrainian society.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2018It\u2019s clear that war isn\u2019t for everyone. Not wanting to serve doesn\u2019t mean wanting to become Russian,\u2019 says Kobzin. \u2018A consensus has formed: some fight, others live their lives. Many avoid the unpleasantries of the army,\u00a0 the loss of comfort, family, risking injury, or even death. Every war has been like this. This one is no exception.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nAccording to a 2024 <\/span>survey<\/span><\/a> conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the Razumkov Center sociological service, most Ukrainians (73%) believe that Russia must fulfill certain conditions before peace talks can begin. A <\/span>poll<\/span><\/a> conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in September-October 2024 found that 81% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine can succeed if the West provides adequate support. This survey was conducted before Donald Trump\u2019s second election victory and his fluctuating support for Ukraine. However, most studies show that Ukrainians are not ready to accept peace on Russia\u2019s terms and are ready to fight if there are no other alternatives to a just peace.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2018No one knows the exact losses; there\u2019s a lot of criticism of commanders, weapon shortages. People often focus on the worst outcome of service \u2013\u00a0 loss of life. Yet, people still enlist, even voluntarily,\u2019 Kobzin says. \u2018Talk of negotiations and expectations of a quick resolution will negatively affect these statistics. But we need to work not so much with those adamantly against service but with those who have fears that can be addressed.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nVitaliy says Donald Trump\u2019s statements motivated him to fight: \u2018You know you need to be here.\u2019 Maryna adds: \u2018Every morning, I ask what negotiated outcome I\u2019d want. I\u2019d love my husband back soon but not at the cost of surrendering or forgiving the Russians. We can\u2019t agree to freeze things as they are.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\nIn early February Ukraine\u2019s Defense Ministry offered one-year contracts for 1 million hryvnias (\u20ac23,500) to attract 18-24-year-old recruits. Vitaliy says he called a friend who has a 20-year-old son when he heard about the initiative and asked if he was ready to go to war on such terms. The answer was no. \u2018It\u2019s a big sum, even with inflation, but I want motivated people beside me, not those joining out of desperation.\u2019 <\/span>Ukraine still lacks legally defined terms of service \u2013 a reform that soldiers and families had anticipated but was still absent from the 2024-updated mobilization law, so m<\/span>otivation, clear communication, and better training and service conditions remain critical encouragement.<\/span><\/p>\nWhat should Europeans prepare for?<\/h2>\nUS Vice President, J.D. Vance\u2019s Munich Security Conference speech, claiming that Europe\u2019s real security threat is its issues with <\/span>internal democracy and free speech,<\/span> not Russia, was a wake-up call for European leaders. With US troop presence in Europe and NATO ties in question, EU nations, especially Baltic and Scandinavian states, are revising their defence strategies.<\/span><\/p>\nIn a potential NATO-Russia conflict, Western nations would have access to high-tech weapons, but training programmes would be lacking. As a <\/span>RUSI<\/span><\/a> report notes: \u2018High-end weapons also require high-end troops. These take significant time to train \u2013 time which is unavailable in a war with high attrition rates.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n\u2018A key lesson: we weren\u2019t ready in the first six months of the invasion to absorb many recruits. Our defence system \u2013 training, logistics \u2013 wasn\u2019t prepared,\u2019 says Kobzin. \u2018You need to mobilize many people at the onset of aggression before they reconsider.\u2019 Kobzin believes it is necessary to develop a system of training from childhood onwards. \u2018Polls in European countries show that the percentage of people willing to fight with weapons today is small. Everyone thinks it won\u2019t happen to their country. But we thought the same,\u2019 he says. Europe should emulate Ukraine\u2019s whole-of-society defence approach, fostering government, civil society, and business collaboration to build Western societal resilience and readiness to act.<\/span><\/p>\n\u2018Since the Second World War, Europe hasn\u2019t questioned its survival. But large-scale war has returned to the continent and it is time to seriously rethink Europe\u2019s security architecture, which has always relied on the US\u2019s security umbrella,\u2019 emphasizes Jaroslava Barbieri, doctoral student at the University of Birmingham and co-author of this study. \u2018Today, Europe needs to have an honest and consistent conversation with its societies about the fact that war is already here, to reject the illusion that people are safe, and to finally abandon the old political strategies that tried to include Russia in the European security architecture. Talking about values, democracy and a common cultural space are empty words without a consistent conversation about the transformation of the European security framework.\u2019 Barbieri considers exclusively focusing on a high-tech, professional army is flawed in light of the Ukrainian experience. During a full-scale invasion, virtually everyone has to be on the defensive. Society is ideally prepared. \u2018The Ukrainian experience of how to communicate with society, how to encourage, how to take into account mistakes, is invaluable for Europe. Ukraine should be given a leadership role in conversations about changing the defence paradigm.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/p>\nThe stories of Sashko and Vitaliy highlight findings from the 2024 PIJL and KISR study, based on 17 in-depth online interviews and discussions with three focus groups conducted in March and April across Ukraine. Participants included active AFU soldiers, civilian men (above and below draft age)<\/span><\/i>, wives and mothers of soldiers, and veterans. <\/span><\/i>The Public Interest Journalism Lab<\/span><\/i><\/a> is a Ukrainian media NGO, which promotes constructive discussion around complex social topics, combining content creation and sociological research, to explore how to overcome polarization.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n[ad_2]\nSource link <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"[ad_1] Though the US has not entirely abandoned the idea of brokering a deal between Russia and Ukraine, it has become clear that the White<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":278376,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[154],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/278375"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=278375"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/278375\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/278376"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=278375"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=278375"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=278375"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}](\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:UA_59th_bgd_household_03.jpg\"){kind=link}