{"id":248918,"date":"2024-07-29T17:15:34","date_gmt":"2024-07-29T17:15:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/2024\/07\/29\/voxeu-the-russian-sanctions-and-dollar-foreign-exchange-reserves\/"},"modified":"2025-06-25T17:13:40","modified_gmt":"2025-06-25T17:13:40","slug":"voxeu-the-russian-sanctions-and-dollar-foreign-exchange-reserves","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/michigandigitalnews.com\/index.php\/2024\/07\/29\/voxeu-the-russian-sanctions-and-dollar-foreign-exchange-reserves\/","title":{"rendered":"VoxEU: \u201cThe Russian sanctions and dollar foreign exchange reserves\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

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From a VoxEU article<\/a> today, by Robert N. McCauley<\/a> with Hiro Ito and Menzie Chinn:<\/p>\n

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Will the freezing of the Bank of Russia\u2019s foreign exchange reserves undermine the dollar\u2019s predominant role in official foreign exchange reserves? This column examines the aggregate evidence since end-2021 for any reduction in the dollar share of official foreign exchange reserves against a baseline constructed with data from 1999 through 2021. The observed dollar share in March 2024 differs little from the out-of-sample projection based on this baseline. On this showing, official reserve managers have not reduced the role of the dollar since the freeze of the Bank of Russia\u2019s assets.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The key graph (Figure 1<\/a> from the article):<\/p>\n

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Source: IMF Cofer; authors\u2019 calculations.
Note: Projection uses 2021Q4 dollar share of 58.8%, constant of -.121 and coefficient for the effect of valuation change of .735. where the latter two are estimated from quarterly changes in the dollar share over the 91 quarters 1999Q2-2021Q4.<\/h6>\n

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Link to Chinn, Frankel and Ito (JIMF, 2024)<\/a>, cited above.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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