Using the April 2024 WEO projections (the July update indicates no revision for 2024 growth, and -0.3 ppts for 2025 y\/y), we can see the following trajectory for Russian output, and Russia output ex-military spending.<\/p>\n
Figure 1:<\/strong> Russia GDP (blue), and GDP ex-military spending (red), all in billions of 2021 roubles. Light green indicates projections. Source: for GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2024 database<\/a>, and SIPRI [1]<\/a>, SIPRI [2]<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n The above calculation assumes that military spending is essentially on goods and services, so that expenditures equal production. Keep in mind that GDP does not include depreciation (which presumably, between run-down of inventory of tanks in storage, and obsolescence of equipment dependent on imported inputs, has increased).<\/p>\n This means the growth rate of civilian expenditures is substantially below that of GDP.<\/p>\n Figure 2: <\/strong>\u00a0Year-on-Year growth rate of Russia GDP (blue), and GDP ex-military spending (red), all in billions of 2021 roubles. Light green indicates projections. Source: for GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2024 database<\/a>, and SIPRI [1]<\/a>, SIPRI [2]<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n The cumulative increase in GDP in 2023 since 2021 is 2.3%, vs. 0.3% for cumulative GDP ex-military.<\/p>\n While the IMF and World Bank projects positive output growth for 2025, as does the MoF\u2019s baseline scenario, the MoF\u2019s stress scenario allows for nil growth<\/a>. Gorodnichenko sees a recession, as recounted in this post<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/econbrowser.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/russiapix_jul24.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n