When Jean-Claude Juncker became president of the European Commission in 2014, he declared that accession negotiations would continue over the next five years, especially with the countries of the Western Balkans, but that there would be no new enlargement <\/a>before 2020. His statement was harshly condemned in the Western Balkans and Juncker had to soften his tone.<\/p>\n Ten years later, not one Western Balkan candidate has joined the EU. But for most politicians in these countries, this is no cause for dissatisfaction. For them, the never-ending journey towards the European Union seems like a decent prospect.<\/p>\n Pretending to be implementing reforms and introducing European standards, while in fact being only interested in access to European funds, is a common form of hypocrisy among Balkan politicians. But even entering the EU is not a failsafe protection against undemocratic processes. Some Western Balkan countries have either shown signs of democratic backsliding even after joining the EU or face strong internal challenges that undermine the democratic system.<\/p>\n Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU\u2019s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans has become more resolute. The issue now is not whether the EU wants these countries, but whether it can leave them out. As Russia revives its imperialist ambitions, envisioning a Eurasia stretching \u2018from Lisbon to Vladivostok<\/a>\u2019 (Dmitry Medvedev), the security risk of exposing part of Europe to the Kremlin\u2019s influence is too great for the EU. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock recently described EU enlargement as a \u2018geopolitical necessity<\/a>\u2019, saying that the EU could not allow itself \u2018grey areas\u2019 in the Balkans.<\/p>\n Understandably, European officials remain focused on countries immediately threatened by Russia\u2019s aggressive policies \u2013 in other words, direct military intervention. But keeping the Western Balkans oriented westward is still very much on the EU agenda. EU leaders continue sending encouraging signals about the region\u2019s European prospects.<\/p>\n According to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, the candidate countries, including the Western Balkans, have a \u2018historic window of opportunity<\/a>\u2019 to bind their future to the EU. The bloc\u2019s envoy for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, Miroslav Laj\u010d\u00e1k, has affirmed that membership prospects are now \u2018stronger and clearer than ever<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n At a December summit, EU leaders called on the Western Balkans <\/a>to implement decisive reforms to accelerate accession. The summit declaration <\/a>that they adopted highlighted rule of law, fighting corruption, human rights and economic overhauls as key priorities. The summit also promised the region over \u20ac6 billion in aid, made conditional on enacting such reforms.<\/p>\n But this optimistic mood may not last indefinitely. There is no united European front, nor a universal consensus that Russia poses the primary threat. After the EP elections, it is likely that there will be more MEPs sympathetic to the Kremlin and opposed to EU enlargement than has been the case during the current legislature.<\/p>\n Ultimately, however, the central challenge remains the political realities in the Balkan states themselves. EU members issue encouraging rhetoric, but developments on the ground cannot be discounted. The Western Balkan countries are formally on the European path and have declared EU membership to be their primary objective. But whether their politicians are really working towards it is another matter. More broadly, it needs to be asked to what extent European values are rooted in the individual Balkan societies, and what the population\u2019s attitude towards the EU really is.<\/p>\n It has been five years since Serbia opened any new chapters in its negotiations with the EU. Although integration has not been ended formally, the regime in Belgrade is doing everything in its power to estrange Serbia from the EU.<\/p>\n All power in the country rests with one man: Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107. The president wields total control<\/a>, openly handpicking government members. The premier, Ana Brnabi\u0107<\/a>, boasted that she addresses Vu\u010di\u0107 as \u2018boss\u2019<\/a>, and high-ranking state officials take every opportunity to emphasise they are only putting his policies into practice.<\/p>\n Most of the press<\/a> are also under the president\u2019s control<\/a>. The media lynching<\/a> of political dissenters and critics of the government is a daily occurrence. Institutions are taken over and subjugated to the ruling party and free elections are impossible. Corruption is rife and the intertwining of political and criminal structures is too complex for investigative journalists to unravel.<\/p>\n Serbia was singled out for criticism at the recent EU summit in Brussels for not imposing sanctions on Russia<\/a> and not harmonizing its foreign policy with the EU\u2019s, despite having voluntarily committed itself to doing so. Such censure has been voiced time and again since the beginning of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n Not only has Serbia not imposed sanctions on Russia, but the loyalist media have become a platform<\/a> for rabid Kremlin propaganda<\/a>. Sputnik and RT, both of which are banned in the EU, carry on business as usual. Paradoxically, these Kremlin outposts are not even the most radical pro-Russian media in the country. The demonisation of democracy, liberalism, European values and everything from the West is the core content of most Serbian media.<\/p>\n Rather than embracing EU standards of rule of law<\/a>, media freedom and democratic norms, Vu\u010di\u0107 appears bent on creating a Russian satellite in the Balkans \u2013 even as Belgrade accepts European investment and aid. His ruling Serbian Progressive Party openly celebrates Russia\u2019s governance model while mocking the EU. It is unsurprising that only 46% of Serbian citizens<\/a> favour EU membership, according to an October 2022 poll.<\/p>\n Vu\u010di\u0107 is systematically working to destabilize the region<\/a>, especially in countries with a substantial Serbian ethnic community: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo<\/a>. His associates promote a \u2018Serbian World\u2019 concept mirroring Russia\u2019s revanchist vision, aiming to achieve 1990s-era Greater Serbia ambitions \u2013 for now by \u2018peaceful\u2019 means. Yet the EU maintains a policy of appeasement<\/a>, with diplomats failing to pry Vu\u010di\u0107 from Moscow\u2019s orbit despite occasional European Parliament criticism.<\/p>\n Indeed, the latest EU resolution demands<\/a> an independent probe into suspected electoral fraud during Serbia\u2019s December 2022 parliamentary and local elections. It threatens to suspend funding if direct government involvement in fraud is uncovered and calls for auditing EU pre-accession aid amid longstanding transparency concerns.<\/p>\n But with Vu\u010di\u0107 continuing to tighten his grip on power, undermining democratic institutions and fanning ethnic tensions, Serbia looks increasingly less like a genuine EU membership candidate. The empty overtures<\/a> from Belgrade will no longer suffice.<\/p>\n Among the countries of the Western Balkans, Montenegro has taken the lead in Euro-Atlantic integration. It joined NATO in 2017, opened all thirty-three negotiation chapters and curbed Russian influence<\/a>. Notwithstanding the shortcomings in its fight against corruption, rule of law failures and related issues, Montenegro had been on a clearly charted European course supported by a majority of the population.<\/p>\n Then came the 2020 elections, ending decades of rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). After the change of government, Montenegro formally continued with its integration process, and western officials predicted that the country would become a member of the EU within four years. But things look different on the ground.<\/p>\n Russian influence is increasingly prevalent, especially through structures connected to the regime in Belgrade. One example: In 2021, Vladimir Bo\u017eovi\u0107, the founder of the online newspaper IN4S, was appointed rector of the University of Montenegro (and reappointed for a second term this year). IN4S is one of the most ardent spreaders of Kremlin propaganda and the Greater Serbia narrative, including constant denial of the genocide in Srebrenica.<\/p>\n The recent change of government in Montenegro has been accompanied by the growing influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in the country\u2019s politics, raising concerns over the erosion of secularism. A series of processions organized by the SPC, with support from pro-Serbian parties and Serbian media, paved the way for the government transition. Representatives of the SPC have now become significant players in political life, frequently consulted by public officials on various issues of national importance.<\/p>\n The Church is a centralized institution led from Belgrade by Patriarch Porfirije, a long-time ally of Vu\u010di\u0107 who consistently propagates the official policies of the regime. The latest example of the SPC\u2019s alignment with Serbia\u2019s agenda is the Patriarch\u2019s Easter epistle, in which Porfirije echoed Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s campaign against a recent UN Resolution on the Srebrenica genocide. In particular, he repeated the regime\u2019s false claim that the Resolution declared the entire Serbian people to be genocidal. The Montenegrin authorities have followed suit, also proposing amendments to the Resolution aimed at supporting Serbia\u2019s campaign, and emphasizing that guilt cannot be attributed to any one nation, ethnic or religious group.<\/p>\n While Montenegro may be the first among the Western Balkan nations to join the EU, there are concerns it could follow a path similar to Hungary if malign Russian and Serbian influence is left unchecked. Such a scenario is not far-fetched. The current president of Montenegro\u2019s parliament, Andrija Mandi\u0107, was sentenced to five years in prison<\/a> in 2019 for planning terrorist acts and trying to undermine Montenegro\u2019s constitutional order in a bid to prevent the country from joining NATO. After the 2020 elections, an appeals court overturned Mandi\u0107\u2019s sentence and acquitting him. The trial highlighted the presence of anti-western forces within Montenegro.<\/p>\n Bosnia-Herzegovina received official candidate status in December 2022, and the European Council decided to open negotiations on the country\u2019s EU membership in March this year. According to a recent survey by the Directorate for European Integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 73.3% of respondents supported<\/a> joining the EU; the approval rate was 86% in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina but only 50.6% in the Republika Srpska, the semi-autonomous ethnic Serbian entity within the country.<\/p>\n The Republika Srpska entity is ruled with an iron fist by Milorad Dodik, a man under US sanctions. Seen as Putin\u2019s main puppet in the Balkans, Dodik\u2019s loyalty surpasses even that of Vu\u010di\u0107, who is regarded as a more pragmatic politician. Dodik persistently advocates for the Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina and be incorporated into Serbia. Since the start of the full-scale war, he has met repeatedly with the Russian president<\/a>, and last year received from Putin the Order of Alexander Nevsky for his contributions to Russian-Bosnian cooperation. Dodik vocally supports Russia\u2019s \u2018special operation\u2019 in Ukraine, stating during a visit to Moscow <\/a>last year that: \u2018We understand that this is not a war between Ukraine and Russia \u2013 this is a clash between Russia and the West, which is trying to use Russia as a way to further inflame this war.\u2019<\/p>\n A report<\/a> submitted to the United Nations by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina states that the authorities of the Republika Srpska, led by Dodik, are actively undermining the Bosnian state, its competencies, institutions, and the Dayton Peace Agreement itself.<\/p>\n While Dodik\u2019s ability to cause serious conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not great, he is quite capable of hindering the country\u2019s European prospects and sabotaging all efforts towards reforms and EU membership. The opposition in Republika Srpska is not much better \u2013 its politicians are united in incurable nationalism<\/a>, the denial of war crimes and genocide, and glorification of war criminals, first and foremost Ratko Mladi\u0107. In this respect, they fully concur not just with Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s regime, but also with a large part of the Serbian opposition, as well as influential intellectual, academic and ecclesiastical circles.<\/p>\n Half of Bosnia-Herzegovina<\/a> is devoted to anti-European and anti-liberal values, and it enjoys the support of Serbia in this. To summarise: there are obstacles on Bosnia-Herzegovina\u2019s path to join the EU that will be hard to overcome, despite the current European structures\u2019 good intentions.<\/p>\n Among the Western Balkan nations, Kosovo remains the only one yet to attain EU candidate status. Despite applying in December 2022, it has hit a brick wall. The crux of the issue is that five EU member states \u2013 Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus \u2013 do not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign country. Spain\u2019s stance stems from concerns over emboldening separatist movements in Catalonia and the Basque region, while Greece\u2019s position is linked to its historical ties with Serbia and the ongoing Cyprus dispute.<\/p>\n For years, the EU has mediated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in an effort to normalise relations between the two countries. These efforts have been persistently obstructed by Serbia, which refuses to accept Kosovo\u2019s independence \u2013 a central tenet of Serbian politics across the political spectrum.<\/p>\n Kosovo\u2019s government, led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, is distinctly pro-western and pro-European, viewing the country as part of the Euro-Atlantic world. However, the EU\u2019s political structures appear to favour Serbia, with the Serbian Progressive Party (SPS) regime controlling Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo and using them as a destabilizing force.<\/p>\n Allegations have surfaced of Serbia\u2019s involvement in provocations and even a terrorist attack last year in the village of Banjska, carried out by an associate of Vu\u010di\u0107. Despite this, the EU has penalized Kosovo\u2019s government.<\/p>\n Croatia became the 28th European Union member state in 2013. However, the country\u2019s democratic development has stagnated for years. For the sixth consecutive year, Freedom House\u2019s annual \u2018Nations in Transition<\/a>\u2019 report gave Croatia a score of 4.25 out of 7, indicating an entrenched democratic deficit. \u00a0The report cites widespread corruption at all levels of government, a sluggish response from prosecutors to high-level graft cases, and concerns over media independence. Public trust in Croatia\u2019s judicial system remains among the lowest in the EU.<\/p>\n Since 2016, the centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) has led the government under the leadership of Andrej Plenkovi\u0107. For most of this time it has been in coalition with the minority Serb party. But after the parliamentary elections in April 2024, HDZ formed a new administration with the rightwing populist Homeland Movement, raising fears of a further democratic deterioration.<\/p>\n The Homeland Movement<\/a> advocates tighter restrictions on migrant workers and stricter border controls. It also calls for a withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention to combat violence against women and opposes LGBTQ rights. Its far-right ideology is likely to shape government policies under Plenkovi\u0107\u2019s third term as prime minister.<\/p>\n The opposition is little better. Croatian President Zoran Milanovi\u0107 of the Social Democrats holds strongly pro-Russian views<\/a>, opposes Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership, criticizes western military aid and has predicted Kyiv\u2019s imminent defeat by an \u2018indestructible<\/a>\u2019 Russia. With an illiberal governing coalition and a pro-Kremlin opposition, Croatia\u2019s democracy faces a tight squeeze.<\/p>\n Of the former Yugoslav states, Slovenia has progressed furthest <\/a>on democratic norms, human rights and rule of law since joining the EU in 2004. However, its democracy faced a major test during Janez Jan\u0161a\u2019s third term as prime minister from 2020 to 2022.<\/p>\n Jan\u0161a\u2019s right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party clashed with EU partners and attempted to steer Slovenia towards an Orb\u00e1n-style illiberal autocracy. Civil society fiercely resisted through constant protests <\/a>until early elections were called in April 2022. Jan\u0161a\u2019s Slovenian Democratic Party suffered a heavy defeat<\/a> against Robert Golob\u2019s newly formed social-liberal party Freedom Movement. The election saw the highest turnout in 20 years. But while the populist threat in Slovenia has receded, the anti-democratic danger persists, with Jan\u0161a casting the European elections as a referendum on the new government<\/a>.<\/p>\n Serbia has emerged as a major source of instability and a hub for disseminating anti-European and anti-liberal sentiments across the Balkans. Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s regime is accused of using its influence over other Western Balkan nations to alienate them from the EU and the West, potentially drawing them closer into Russia\u2019s orbit.<\/p>\n Critics argue that Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s government destabilizes not only the region but also the EU itself, as the issue of enlargement becomes intertwined with security concerns. Curbing Serbia\u2019s influence over Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro is seen as a necessary step for these countries\u2019 European integration prospects.<\/p>\n Lessons from the EU\u2019s past engagement with Vladimir Putin suggest that appeasing autocratic leaders is the wrong approach. However, accession will not inoculate nations against undemocratic forces, as evidenced by backsliding in EU member Croatia and democratic setbacks even in Slovenia, widely considered the most democratic country in the Western Balkans.<\/p>\n All of this underscores that the fight for democracy is an ongoing process. Ensuring stability and democratic consolidation in the Western Balkans remains a critical challenge for the region and the broader European project.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.eurozine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/moodoftheunion_BHCKMS-copy-1024x574.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nEncouraging messages from the EU<\/h2>\n
Serbia\u2019s anti-Europeanism<\/h2>\n
Montenegro under malign influence<\/h2>\n
Insurmountable obstacles in Bosnia-Herzegovina
<\/strong><\/h2>\nKosovo\u2019s brick wall<\/h2>\n
Democratic deterioration in Croatia<\/h2>\n
Slovenia\u2019s populist temptation<\/h2>\n
Prospects<\/h2>\n