In early June this year, Romanians will be summoned to polling booths for their fifth round of European Parliament elections. Voter turnout for Romania\u2019s first three EP polls was dismal, with attendance <\/span>hovering around the 30-percent mark<\/span><\/a>. Add to this the fact that 2024 is a super-election year for Romanians, who will be called on to choose their mayors, MPs, EP representatives and president, all in the span of several months.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In what may well be an attempt to minimise the toll that this will take on the state budget, as well as a strategy to avoid voter fatigue and <\/span>curb the rise of the far<\/span> right<\/span><\/a>, the current ruling coalition (PSD\u2013PNL) opted to merge the EP elections with local ones. Romania\u2019s two ruling parties are historic rivals. PSD\u2019s European affiliation lies with the centre-left Party of European Socialists, while PNL is a member of the European People\u2019s Party centre-right group. As popular wisdom on Romanian politics would have it, the country\u2019s rulers set the elections that Romanians care about least on the same date as the ones they care about most. Voter turnout in the most recent three rounds of local elections, 2020, 2016, and 2012 was <\/span>around 50 percent<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n While this is likely to have a positive impact on the EP election turnout, it also sets the stage for mainstream parties and candidates to focus their communication on mayoral campaigns and mostly to remain silent on European topics. This presents two distinct problems.<\/span><\/p>\n On the one hand, it allows the major parties to quietly carry on with their behind-the-scenes infighting, in a race to figure out who to \u2018send to Brussels\u2019. An EP candidate nomination is widely regarded as a strategy for party leaders to \u2018exile\u2019 undesirable members, often former public servants, without actually ousting them and risking a scandal.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The PSD list holds several such examples, including disgraced former Bucharest mayor Gabriela Firea, who was the focus of <\/span>a notorious 2023 journalistic investigation<\/span><\/a> that revealed her family\u2019s involvement in managing a number of retirement homes that were found to have abused the elderly residents. At the time of writing, Firea is the PSD candidate for Bucharest mayor, but has not yet withdrawn her EP candidacy. Also on PSD\u2019s roll is current MEP Maria Grapini, <\/span>infamous<\/span><\/a> for her frequent public communication blunders.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n On the other hand, it clears the way for far-right political formations \u2013 most notably Alian\u021ba pentru Unirea Rom\u00e2nilor (AUR) and the newly minted AUR breakaway S.O.S Party \u2013 to bid for voter attention with xenophobic, ultra-nationalistic, anti-European and isolationist rhetoric.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The Romanian far right <\/span>saw<\/span><\/a> a massive boost in popularity during t<\/span>he COVID-19 pandemic, when it protested insistently against the enforcement of mask-wearing and vaccination.<\/span> This landed with the Romanian population, as it echoed a widespread belief, highlighted by <\/span>a March 2022 IPSOS survey<\/span><\/a> indicating that Romanians both feared the side-effects of the COVID-19 vaccine and mistrusted its efficiency.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The far right is also <\/span>favoured<\/span><\/a> among conservative and\/or economically disenfranchised classes of <\/span>the Romanian diaspora<\/span><\/a>. EP candidate, S.O.S leader and Romanian senator Diana \u0218o\u0219oac\u0103 is openly pro-Russian and has repeatedly <\/span>asked<\/span><\/a> the West to stop the war she claims it started in Ukraine. The AUR EP candidate list is equally contentious, featuring, among others, current MEP Cristian Terhe\u0219, who has vocally <\/span>criticised<\/span><\/a> the European Parliament for enforcing the surveillance of European citizens, while also espousing anti-vaccine, homophobic, transphobic and conspiratorial views.<\/span><\/p>\n As of the latest polls, AUR is poised to come in second or third in the EP elections, with SOS tailgating at around 5 percent. This means that Romania might end up sending two far-right parties to the EP rather than one. The concern is that <\/span>populism is gaining<\/span><\/a> serious ground<\/span> in the country, as it is in many other European member states.<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, Romania\u2019s two major parties have entered an alliance that is purportedly trying to chip away at this anti-European upheaval. It remains to be seen whether this is a winning strategy for Romanian democracy in the longer term, or if their opponents\u2019 tactic of offering their electorate several choices, albeit variations on the same theme, is a better long game.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Also vying for MEP status are members of PNL, one of the parties in the country\u2019s ruling coalition \u2013 who, much like PNL-backed Romanian president Klaus Iohannis, have largely remained silent on pressing issues. Other presumably viable EP candidates are running on behalf of a centre-right wing alliance of parties with various degrees of voter credibility issues (USR, PMP, For\u021ba Dreptei). The list is completed by UDMR, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, an EPP member and current holder of two EP seats.<\/span><\/p>\n These are some of Romania\u2019s would-be European players, gearing up on a national stage that has seen tensions rise over the past four years. At the top of a non-exhaustive list of confounding factors are Russia\u2019s war in neighbouring Ukraine, Romania\u2019s repeatedly foiled attempts at becoming a fully-fledged member of the Schengen area, and an acute cost-of-living crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n At the NATO summit in Madrid in 2022, Iohannis announced that, following Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Romania would expand its defence spending to 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product. However, <\/span>a NATO report for 2014\u20132023<\/span><\/a> published last year shows that the country managed to only spend 1.6 percent of its GDP in 2023, far below the minimal threshold requested by the alliance and well under average NATO expenditure. Only 21 percent of that money was used for acquiring technology \u2013 a paltry amount compared to the 53 percent spent by Poland.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n While Romania has provided military aid for Ukraine, its leaders have mostly kept quiet on the matter. At a European Council meeting in Brussels in March this year, President Iohannis <\/span>stated<\/span><\/a> that this was an intentional effort aimed at mitigating the risks of Russian interference. Romania\u2019s Supreme National Defence Council 2023 <\/span>report<\/span><\/a>, sent to parliament for approval in March 2024 and released to the press in mid-April, shows Russian attempts at infiltrating Romanian defence institutions and the local Ukrainian refugee community, as well as eroding popular trust in the country\u2019s military. This was reportedly achieved through cybersecurity attacks, efforts to gather intel on military exercises and Romanian military aid transports headed to Ukraine, as well as through pervasive and concentrated mass media disinformation campaigns.<\/span><\/p>\n Unlike other eastern European countries, Romania continues to support Ukraine in its effort to keep up grain exports via the Black Sea port of Constan\u021ba. As well as complaints of Ukrainian trucks crowding Romania\u2019s northern and eastern border crossings, this nonetheless sparked three weeks of farmers\u2019 and transporters\u2019 protests early this year.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Both groups were essentially <\/span>asking<\/span><\/a> the government for various forms of financial aid \u2013 the transporters demanded capping mandatory insurance thresholds at around \u20ac1,000, while the farmers pleaded for subsidies and preferential market conditions, both aimed at dampening the effects of Ukrainian grain transiting Romania. In early February 2024, Romanian PM Marcel Ciolacu brought the protests to a halt by promising (and subsequently <\/span>delivering<\/span><\/a>) an inter-ministerial committee for agriculture and transportation, whose mission would be to protect the interests of the two sectors involved in the protests.<\/span><\/p>\n Similar movements were noticeable in Bulgaria too: in 2022, then-PM Kiril Petkov <\/span>announced plans<\/span><\/a> for the Black Sea coast city of Varna to become a grain hub for Ukraine \u2013 yet these plans remain vague. Farmers\u2019 protests <\/span>peaked between January and February<\/span><\/a> 2024, but calmed after 2023\u20132024 PM Nikolai Denkov <\/span>promised compensation<\/span><\/a> (but only for farmers who could prove recent losses).<\/span><\/p>\n While <\/span>a 2023 survey<\/span><\/a> conducted by the GLOBSEC\u2019s Centre for Democracy & Resilience indicated that Bulgarians are still the biggest fans of Russian president Vladimir Putin<\/span> among the eight central and eastern European countries surveyed (32 percent expresse<\/span>d a positive attitude), a <\/span>UNHCR assessment<\/span><\/a> issued that same year indicated that most Ukrainian refugees in Bulgaria felt welcomed and supported. Similarly, <\/span>an April 2024 poll<\/span><\/a> conducted in Romania by INSCOP for News.ro showed that most locals do not perceive Ukrainians as a threat (37 percent are of the opposite opinion).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n According to the <\/span>UN\u2019s International Organization for Migration<\/span><\/a> data for February 2024, more than 2.2 million Ukrainians had transited Bulgaria during the past two years and nearly 53,000 remain. The same organisation <\/span>reports<\/span><\/a> that 5.4 million Ukrainians transited Romania in the same span of time, with around 78,000 still in the country today.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Despite recently being partially admitted to the Schengen zone (border checks have been lifted at airports and ports), Romania and Bulgaria have yet to receive full membership in the bloc, which would include unrestricted crossings at land borders. Both countries complied with the requirements a long time ago, according to the EU Commission itself, but have been kept out by a veto by Austria and the Netherlands in late 2023. The Austrian interior minister continued to claim that it would be \u2018wrong\u2019 for his country to lift its veto against Romania and Bulgaria, given its concerns that the country could be used as a transit route by migrants from Africa and the Middle East. The reason for the opposition: the Austrian government\u2019s fear of the growing far-right, which is <\/span>on track<\/span><\/a> to become the strongest party at the elections in autumn.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Like most countries in Europe, Romania has seen prices \u2013 and, consequently, inflation \u2013 rise steeply over the past two years. According to the latest Eurostat data, March 2024 was the third month in a row that Romania topped the European inflation rate chart. That month, inflation in the country stood at more than double the EU average: 6.7 percent versus 2.4 percent. Yet considering that the country\u2019s overall inflation was a whopping 9.7% in 2023 \u2013 itself an improvement on 12% in 2022 \u2013 this is actually progress.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Inflation has been <\/span>hitting harder in urban areas<\/span><\/a>, where the rising costs of consumer goods have been piled onto higher taxation levels (35% on income, compared to 10% in rural areas). Consumer habits in the countryside, <\/span>where 46% of Romanians live<\/span><\/a>, are less dependent on supermarket price increases and more reliant on subsistence agriculture and shorter supply chains. In its <\/span>latest macroeconomic forecast<\/span><\/a>, updated in February 2024, Eurostat predicts gradual disinflation for Romania, meaning it is unlikely to see more cost-of-living protests soon, as it did in October 2022. Those were followed by several countrywide strikes, but also by two minimum wage increases.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Amidst these trials and tribulations, Romanians remain fairly trusting of the EU and support their country\u2019s membership. Most of these positive indicators were on the rise, albeit slightly, throughout last year, as shown by a <\/span>special Eurobarometer<\/span><\/a> published in autumn 2023. Strikingly, a massive 75% of Romanian respondents expressed their intention to vote in the 2024 European elections \u2013 above the EU average of 68 percent. This attitude might be linked to the Union\u2019s <\/span>enforcement of rule-of-law principles<\/span><\/a> and its particular encouragement of Romania\u2019s <\/span>anti-corruption efforts<\/span><\/a>. Last, but certainly not least, while Romania has historically lagged behind in absorbing EU funds, <\/span>it has made strides<\/span><\/a> over the past couple of years; these are reflected in <\/span>improvements<\/span><\/a> in infrastructure and agricultural activity that are clearly visible to citizens.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the runup to the EP elections, the attitudes harboured by young Romanians towards politics and their sentiments about the EU present a striking snapshot. A <\/span>March 2024 survey<\/span><\/a> of 800 Romanians aged 18 to 35 conducted by independent think tank IRES revealed that, while the European Union comes second on their list of most trusted institutions, 72 percent are not interested in Romanian politics and 68 percent believe the country is heading in the wrong direction. Most tellingly, 62 percent are strongly mistrustful of political parties.<\/span><\/p>\n Like Romania, Bulgaria will also head to the polls on 9 June to vote in not one, but two elections. For voters this will bring a feeling of both fatigue and <\/span>dej\u00e0-vu<\/span><\/i>. Bulgarians will be voting in the country\u2019s sixth general elections in just three years, a stark symptom of the country\u2019s ongoing political crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n In recent years, general elections, along with presidential and mayoral ballots, have been marked by tension and political clashes between GERB, Bulgaria\u2019s dominant political force since 2008 \u2013 led by autocrati<\/span>c former prime minister Boyko Borissov \u2013 and the opposition, which ranges from reformist parties within GERB\u2019s pro-western centre-right spectrum to pro-Russian voices. Bulgaria\u2019s parties defy traditional left\/right labels: pro-western factions straddle the centre right, while the left is only represented by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which often blurs political lines with the radical far-right party Revival.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Despite being far-right and left respectively, Revival and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) are pro-Russian, expressing anti-western positions and spreading disinformation, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine. Revival consistently maintains a hardline stance, while BSP alternates between overt opposition and silent support. In the April 2023 elections, both parties failed to initiate referendums \u2013 Revival on adopting the euro and BSP on \u2018gender ideology\u2019 in schools. Both parties, but particularly the socialists, also face internal tensions.<\/span><\/p>\n The ongoing political paralysis has led to rapidly shifting alliances, the formation of unusual coalitions and various attempts at cooperation in the hope of finding a way out of the impasse \u2013 all of which have failed. Examples include GERB\u2019s cabinet from 2014-2017, which included the now faded opposition party Reformist Bloc, and the brief tenure of We Continue the Change\u2019s broad cabinet under Kiril Petkov from 2021 to 2022, which ended after coalition member There\u2019s Such a People defected to GERB. The latest endeavour, a coalition between GERB and We Continue the Change under Nikolai Denkov in 2023\u20132024, collapsed abruptly due to disagreements over ministerial positions and judicial reforms, prompting GERB to call for new elections.<\/span><\/p>\n In 2020-2021, anti-establishment protests rocked the country, targeting GERB\u2019s prolonged governance and its parliamentary allies from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, amid struggles in the healthcare system during the COVID-19 pandemic.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The protests, which were met with police violence, highlighted <\/span>society\u2019s desire for change<\/span><\/a> and drew international attention to local issues. Frustration with Bulgaria\u2019s political system boosted opposition parties, including We Continue the Change, Democratic Bulgaria, nationalists There\u2019s Such a People, and the pro-Moscow Bulgarian Socialist Party.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Despite widespread public dissatisfaction, GERB weathered all these storms and has maintained its influence. In fact, in 2024, the party appears even stronger. The party has now solidified its position through a recent reform, ironically sparked by measures meant to limit the power of Bulgaria\u2019s pro-Moscow president, Rumen Radev. As part of their shared pro-western perspective \u2013 more of a utilitarian outlook for GERB and Movement for Rights and Freedoms \u2013 the coalition amended the constitution to limit the president\u2019s rights to form an interim government. Now, the<\/span> president cannot just form a caretaker cabinet on his or her own, <\/span><\/a>but has to choose between the chairman of the National Assembly, the governor or deputy governor of the National Bank, the chairman or deputy chairman of the Chamber of Audit, or the ombudsman or deputies.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Many current officials have ties to GERB from Borissov\u2019s past cabinets. Bulgaria\u2019s caretaker prime minister Dimitar Glavchev was a GERB MP from 2009 to2021 and was selected for his current post partly due to his other role as head of the Chamber of Audit. This strategy fits GERB\u2019s pattern of eliminating the opposition by temporarily siding with it, while retaining institutional control.<\/span><\/p>\n The dual elections in Bulgaria on 9 June are expected to reflect each other\u2019s outcomes and party dynamics. GERB and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms are likely to secure another Pyrrhic victory, placing them in a parliament besieged by opposition forces.<\/span><\/p>\n On 8 May, <\/span>a survey by Alpha Research<\/span><\/a> pointed to GERB and United Democratic Forces winning both the general and the EP elections with room to spare, ahead of major opponents We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria (25.4 percent for GERB against 17.5 percent in the general elections, 25.1 percent against 18.5 percent).<\/span><\/p>\n On <\/span>10 May, <\/span>another poll<\/span><\/a> cited similar numbers and predicted that members of GERB, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, Democratic Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and Revival would be elected to the European Parliament. This would mean that Bulgaria\u2019s EP group would stay predominantly pro-EU by a margin and be dominated by GERB.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The vote on 9 June will be also marked by ideological division among Bulgarian voters \u2013 fuelled by the painful and in many ways unfinished transition from a communist regime to a market economy, and more recently by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and rampant Russian disinformation, which has increased since 2022 (detailed most <\/span>recently here<\/span><\/a> by the Sofia-based NGO Human and Social Studies Foundation). The ongoing political stalemate is welcomed by Bulgaria\u2019s Eurosceptic parties, which are hungry for power and looking to seize any opportunity, but which remain a fragmented presence on the scene.<\/span><\/p>\n Amidst these relentless internal conflicts, Bulgaria\u2019s world is shrinking. Over the past four years, political and media discourse has increasingly turned inwards, neglecting the country\u2019s role as an EU and NATO member and its potential influence on EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. The absence of clear communication and dialogue is leaving the Bulgarian population ever more susceptible to disinformation and populism, affecting voter decisions in both domestic and EU elections. This trend is expected to further marginalise opposition voices and impede debates on wider-reaching issues.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Although Bulgaria\u2019s pro-Russian parties rarely act in unison, they will remain a factor for the foreseeable future and carry the danger of nationalist and\/or pro-Russia voices infiltrating the European Parliament. All eyes are on Bulgaria\u2019s main far-right party Revival, founded in 2014 but <\/span>a marginal force until it ramped up its aggressive rhetoric<\/span><\/a> after the beginning of Bulgaria\u2019s inoculation campaign against COVID-19. The party\u2019s anti-vax stance eventually evolved into a more general anti-western and isolationist position after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The party has also repeated some lines from the Kremlin playbook: for example, in November 2022 Revival<\/span> tried to draft a law against \u2018foreign agents\u2019,<\/span><\/a> which like the law currently being contested by the protests in Georgia is essentially an effort to repress critical and liberal media.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Revival has managed to <\/span>strengthen its international presence<\/span><\/a>: in February, the party\u2019s leaders travelled to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin\u2019s United Russia party and then to Chisinau to meet and sign a partnership agreement with a Moldovan party bearing the same name and ideological affiliation. The party is also using the EP plebiscite and the general elections as an opportunity to reach out to a wider pool of voters. For instance, veteran Bulgaria National Radio journalist Petar Volgin, known for his pro-Kremlin stance, is now entering politics by running for the European Parliament with Revival.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span>The most recent surveys on the Bulgarian public\u2019s political leanings show a divided but still predominantly pro-EU nation<\/span>. A survey on 13 March<\/span><\/a> pointed to 60% support for the EU but with many sceptical on increased migration (70%), the green deal (40%) or further aid from the EU to Ukraine (45%). Only 32% plan to vote in the European elections and 29% are still undecided on whether to head to the polls for the national elections. Bulgarian voters might be divided in their politics and beliefs, but they are united in their frustration over the prolonged parliamentary logjam and the general chaos of the country\u2019s contemporary politics.<\/span><\/p>\n Both Romania and Bulgaria seem to be at a crossroads, and while this could be said throughout the turbulent recent histories of both countries, 2024 has a different flavour. With disillusioned electorates and fading hopes for change, the elections in both countries feel crucial for their EU perspectives. This crisis in trust is fertile soil for the far right, and populists will see a chance to gain ground across the spectrum.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.eurozine.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/moodoftheunion_BR-copyheader-1024x574.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nCost of living: Over the worst?<\/h2>\n
Bulgaria\u2019s election rollercoaster goes on\u2026 and on<\/h2>\n
Few hopes for genuine change<\/h2>\n