One shouldn\u2019t just say increasing (or decreasing) trade between potential adversaries predicts something.<\/p>\n
From Edgar Crammond, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , Jul., 1914, Vol. 77, No. 8 (Jul., 1914), pp. 777-824<\/a>:<\/p>\n Source: Crammond (1914)<\/a>, p.790.<\/p>\n In 1911, the percentage of German imports coming from UK empire, Russia, France and Italy was 43.7%, compared to 42.1% in 1900.<\/p>\n Source: Crammond (1914)<\/a>, p.790.<\/p>\n In 1911, the percentage of German exports going to the UK empire, Russia, France and Italy was 38.0%, compared to 48.1% in 1900. Hence, the concentration of trade is going in a different direction. However, it was not primarily going to allies (e.g., Austria-Hungary), but to the rest-of-the-world. As Crammond<\/a> (p. 791-2) notes:<\/p>\n Germany has no overseas Empire capable of exchanging a large trade with the motherland, and she has, therefore, been compelled to seek markets in every part of the world. Her eflorts in this direction have proved entirely successful. German trade is yearly becoming more widely spread throughout the world, and she is, to-day, much less dependent upon any one single market than she was in 1900.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Note that trade values were rising during this time period, so that actual exports to the UK and British Empire were rising.<\/p>\n Source:<\/strong> Jacks (2018)<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n For some recent work on trade and conflict, see Chen and Evers (2023)<\/a>.<\/p>\n And, as always when thinking about trade and power, read Hirschman (1945)<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/econbrowser.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/crammond_tab_imports.png\")
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